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INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the Federal Trade Commission amended the Premerger
Notification Program developed by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act to “provide a
framework for determining when a transaction involving the transfer of rights
to a patent or part of a patent in the pharmaceutical [industry] . . . is reportable
under the Hart Scott Rodino Act.”1 Specifically, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) amended §§ 801.1 and 801.2 of 16 C.F.R. § 801 to codify
an analysis structure that makes exclusive patent licensing agreements in the
pharmaceutical industry reportable asset acquisitions.2
Serious questions exist, however, as to whether the FTC has authority
under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act to promulgate rules that only apply to a
single industry. Furthermore, the justifications offered by the FTC for its
disparate treatment of the pharmaceutical industry have been called into
question. The agency’s decision to single out the pharmaceutical industry
could be deemed arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act, if the disparate treatment is not based on reasonable grounds.
A finding that would result in the agency action being erased from the law as
it currently exists.
Beyond whether it is legally permissible to single out a single industry
under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976 (HSR Act), additional policy
concerns are associated with the implementation of the new amendments. In
a highly competitive industry with constantly changing science, the potential
for a transaction to be delayed while awaiting a decision from the FTC,
consuming large amounts of time and money is a serious issue that will surely
be taken into account when relevant agreements are being contemplated.
While little doubt exists that regulation is necessary, regulatory costs can clog
the developmental pipelines that allow small drug developers to team with
larger entities capable of ensuring new drugs meet their full potential.
With those concerns in mind, the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) filed suit against the FTC in the District
of Columbia, challenging the FTC’s authority to regulate a single industry, as
well as the FTC’s compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).3
Judge Howell of the District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the
suit on summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
after affording the commission the exceptionally high deferential standard

1. Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,705
(Nov. 15, 2013) (codified at 16 C.F.R. Part 801).
2. See id.
3. See Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, No. 13-1974, 2014 WL
2431242 (D.D.C. May 30, 2014).
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announced in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.4 PhRMA is currently
appealing the decision. While the district court engaged in what is commonly
known as the “Chevron two-step,” it failed to consider Chevron “step-zero.”
The Court may have afforded the FTC less deference and undertaken a more
stringent examination of the FTC’s actions, potentially resulting in different
finding, had it considered step zero.
This comment will contemplate whether the District Court in
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Federal Trade
Commission, afforded the FTC proper deference in upholding the agency’s
actions or if a different standard should have been used. Finally, this comment
will consider the effects the amendment might have on the pharmaceutical
industry as well as larger questions about the interaction of intellectual
property law, antitrust law, and administrative regulation. Ultimately, the
outcome of the PhARMA litigation will not only determine the appropriate
level of deference afforded the FTC’s actions, but will affect tens of
thousands of people, if not more. If the recent amendments to the HSR Act
stand, compliance costs will increase and the time it takes to get new, lifesaving drugs to patients will increase.
I. OPERATION AND AMENDMENT OF THE HART-SCOTT-RODINO ACT
A. Origins, Purpose, and Operation of the Hart-Scott Rodino Act
The Federal Trade Commission’s stated mission is to protect consumers
and the American economy from anti-competitive or deceptive practices with
potential to harm the competitive process.5 Outside of its ability to regulate
unfair competition practices through § 2 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, the FTC’s authority to regulate anti-competitive practices is specified in
the Clayton Act6 and the Clayton Act’s amendment, the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act of 1976 (HSR Act).7 Specifically, the Clayton Act provides that “no
person . . . shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another . . .
where . . . the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition.”8
The HSR Act of 1976 amended the Clayton Act to include section 7A,
which granted the FTC authority to preemptively block proposed mergers and

4. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
5. Fed. Trade Comm’n, About the FTC, FTC.GOV, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited
Dec. 31, 2014).
6. Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
7. Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012).
8. Clayton Antitrust Act § 18.
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acquisitions.9
The pre-clearance process, known as the “premerger
notification program,”10 requires companies participating in a qualifying
merger to present the proposed transaction to the FTC before
consummation.11 The FTC has thirty to sixty days to investigate whether the
transaction is anticompetitive in a way that violates US law.12 If a transaction
is deemed anticompetitive, the FTC initiates legal action to obtain an
injunction that will block consummation of the transaction.13 Historically, the
FTC has analyzed asset acquisitions, by determining reportability of a
transaction under a “make, use, and sell” analysis.14
This assessment has also included transfers of patent rights.15 Under that
model, reportability of a transaction turned on whether exclusive rights to
make, use, or sell the subject of patent changed hands.16 Many transactions,
however, are now structured to allow the licensor to retain limited
manufacturing rights or other “co-rights” to develop, promote, market, or
commercialize the product with and for the sole benefit of the licensee.17
Thus, the transactions evade FTC scrutiny under the make, use, and sell
analysis because the licensor in these transactions is not transferring exclusive
rights.18
This transaction structure could be viewed as an attempt to take advantage
of a loophole, allowing companies to engage in anticompetitive transactions
while avoiding FTC review.19 Reasons exist, however, to believe the new
transaction structure serves a more legitimate purpose. As the FTC noted, the
Premerger Notification Office frequently sees these transactions when an
innovator patents a new drug, but cannot bear the costs of the testing and FDA

9. Hart-Scott-Rodino Act § 18a.
10. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Act § 18a.
11. Id. §18a(b), (e)(1)(A).
12. Id. §18a(e)(1)(A).
13. Id. §18a(f).
14. See Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 78 Fed. Reg.
68,705, 68,706 (Nov. 13, 2013) (codified at 16 C.F.R. Part 801).
15. In SCM Corp. v. Xerox, 645 F.2d 1195, 1210 (2d Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit held that
“a patent is a form of property . . . and thus an asset, there seems little reason to exempt patent
acquisitions from scrutiny.”
16. Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 78 Fed. Reg.
68,705, 68,706 (Nov. 15, 2013) (codified at 16 C.F.R. Part 801).
17. See 78 Fed. Reg. 68,707—08 (Nov. 15, 2013) (codified at 16 C.F.R. Part 801).
18. See id. at 68,706.
19. See Memorandum from Burrell to the Fed. Trade Comm’n (Oct. 25, 2012) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/16-cfr-part-801-premergernotification-reporting-and-waiting-period-requirements-project-no.p989316-561795-00005/56179500005-84907.pdf.
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approval process.20 For those innovators an exclusive licensing agreement
presents an opportunity for a greater financial return via revenue sharing than
the innovator could receive from a patent sale.21
B. Exercising New Power Pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
The HSR Act, grants the FTC authority to define the terms used in the
Act22 or “prescribe such others rules as may be necessary and appropriate to
carry out the purposes of [that] section.”23 In 2013, the FTC amended title 16
of the Code of Federal Regulation’s §§ 801.1 and 801.2.24
The amendment added paragraphs (o), (p), and (q) to § 801.1.25 Those
three paragraphs provide key definitions for the terms used in paragraph (g),
which applies only to the pharmaceutical industry.26 The definitions are
strategically structured to enable application to the pharmaceutical industry
based on assertions made by the FTC during the rulemaking process.27
Paragraph (o), defines “all commercially significant rights,” as “the
exclusive rights to a patent that allow only the recipient of the exclusive
patent rights to use the patent in a particular therapeutic area.”28 Paragraph
(p), in turn defines “limited manufacturing rights,” as “the rights retained by a
patent holder to manufacture the products covered by a patent when all other
exclusive rights to the patent within a therapeutic area (or specific indication
within a therapeutic area) have been transferred to the recipient of the patent
rights.”29 “Co-rights,” are then defined to mean “shared rights retained by the
patent holder to assist the recipient of the exclusive patent rights in
developing and commercializing the product covered by the patent . . .
[including], but are not limited to, co-development, co-promotion, comarketing, and co-commercialization.”30
Finally, the amendment added paragraph (g) to section 801.2.31 Paragraph
20. See Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 78 Fed. Reg.
68,705, 68,706 (Nov. 15, 2013) (codified at 16 C.F.R. Part 801).
21. See id. at 68,708.
22. Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d)(2)(A) (2012).
23. Id. §18a(d)(2)(C).
24. Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 78 Fed. Reg.
68,705, 68,712 (Nov. 15, 2013) (codified at 16 C.F.R. Part 801).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 78 Fed. Reg.
68,705 (Nov. 15, 2013) (codified at 16 C.F.R. Part 801).
28. Id. at 68,712–13.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 68,713.
31. Id.
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(g)—applicable only to “NAICS Industry Group 33254” (an FTC
categorization encompassing the pharmaceutical industry)—then uses those
terms in a way that triggers reporting requirements when patent rights are
transferred.32 The most substantive portion of the addition reads:
[p]atent rights are transferred if and only if all commercially
significant rights to a patent, as defined in §801.1(o), for any
therapeutic area (or specific indication within a therapeutic area) are
transferred to another entity. All commercially significant rights are
transferred even if the patent holder retains limited manufacturing
rights, as defined in §801.1(p), or co-rights, as defined in §801.1(q).33
The effect of this paragraph is to make exclusive patent licenses that
convey some but not all rights to “make, use, and sell,” in the pharmaceutical
industry reportable.34 Specifically, paragraph (g) targets transactions in which
the patent holder retains limited manufacturing rights or any other co-right.35
II. THE FTC’S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE A SINGLE INDUSTRY
It is the exclusive application of paragraph (g) to the pharmaceutical
industry and the justifications offered by the FTC that most trouble critics.36
The pre-merger notification process can be costly, time consuming, and add
additional uncertainty to qualifying transactions; making it unsurprising that
the amendment faced harsh opposition from those most directly affected by its
terms.37 Specifically, it is the exclusive application of paragraph (g) to the
pharmaceutical industry and the justifications offered by the FTC that most
troubles critics.38
A. Searching for Authority to Regulate a Single Industry
The FTC lacks authority to target a single industry with additional

32. See id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 68,706.
35. Id.
36. See Memorandum from Pharmaceutical Research and Mfrs. of America to the Fed. Trade
Comm’n (Oct. 25, 2012) available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_
comments/16-cfr-part-801-premerger-notification-reporting-and-waiting-period-requirementsproject-no.p989316-561795-00004/561795-00004-84972.pdf; Memorandum from Varner to the Fed.
Trade Comm’n (Oct. 25, 2012) available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/public_comments/16-cfr-part-801-premerger-notification-reporting-and-waiting-periodrequirements-project-no.p989316-561795-00004/561795-00004-84972.pdf.
37. See id.
38. See id.
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burdens, because the HSR Act is an act of general application, applying to all
“person[s]” not explicitly exempted by or pursuant to the Act.39 The starting
premise of the HSR Act is that “no person shall acquire . . . any assets of any
other person unless both persons . . . unless both . . . file notification”40 The
HSR Act, however, provides three groups of exemptions from the filing
requirement.41 First, the Act imposes a threshold exemption, ensuring small
transactions that are unlikely to have an anticompetitive effect on the much
larger market will not be subject to FTC review.42 Next, Congress provided a
set of class exemptions.43 Congress explicitly listed twelve classes of
transactions it has determined are unlikely to have anticompetitive effects, and
thus, need not be reviewed by the FTC.44 Finally, Congress granted the FTC
special authority to exempt classes of persons and acquisitions “not likely to
violate antitrust laws.”45 In sum, Congress intended the HSR Act to place the
same burden on all persons and transactions unless either Congress, or—in
special circumstances—the FTC deemed a specific class of persons or
transactions unlikely to violate the antitrust laws. Section “d” of the HSR Act,
which is especially important for analyzing the FTC’s authority to regulate a
single industry under the HSR Act, reads:
(d) Commission rules
The Federal Trade Commission, with the concurrence of the Assistant
Attorney General and by rule in accordance with section 553 of title 5,
consistent with the purposes of this section—
(1) shall require that the notification required under subsection (a)
of this section be in such form and contain such documentary material
and information relevant to a proposed acquisition as is necessary and
appropriate to enable the Federal Trade Commission and the Assistant
Attorney General to determine whether such acquisition may, if
consummated, violate the antitrust laws; and
(2) may—
(A) define the terms used in this section;
(B) exempt, from the requirements of this section, classes of
persons, acquisitions, transfers, or transactions which are not likely to
violate the antitrust laws; and
(C) prescribe such other rules as may be necessary and
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012).
Id.
Id.
Id. §18a(a).
Id. §18a(c).
See id.
Id. §18a(d)(2)(B).

LEVERINGTON FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

5/11/2015 11:12 AM

HART SCOTT RONDINO & CHEVRON STEP ZERO

319

appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section.46

The FTC contends its authority to regulate a single industry rests in its
power to define terms as well as its authority to prescribe necessary and
appropriate rules.47 It argues that the addition of paragraph “g” is simply a
clarification of the definition of an asset acquisition in the context of the
pharmaceutical industry, made pursuant to Section 18a (d)(2)(A) of the HSR
Act.48 In a comment submitted during the comment period, PhARMA
questioned the FTC’s justifications, arguing that limiting the clarification to
the pharmaceutical industry does not define any term used in the Act, nor is
paragraph (g) included in the Act’s definition section.49
Secondly, the FTC argued its authority to prescribe rules “necessary and
appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section.”50 To fully contemplate
this second basis of alleged authority, the purpose of the referenced section
must be fully understood. In the case of the HSR Act, the purpose is to
implement the premerger notification program and screen which classes of
persons and transactions are required to file notice before consummation of an
agreement.51 With such a broadly defined purpose, the ability to prescribe
rules necessary to carry out that purpose is a very broad power, indeed. If the
FTC does have authority to target a single industry, it likely comes from this
broad grant of power. Use of that broad power, however, is conditioned on
compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act.
B. The District Court’s Application of Chevron Deference
1. District Court Decision
In 2013, PhRMA filed a lawsuit in the District of Columbia’s District
Court challenging the FTC’s authority to regulate a single industry, as well as
the FTC’s compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).52 Judge
Howell afforded the FTC the exceptionally high level of deference announced

46. Id. §18a(d).
47. Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 78 Fed. Reg.
68,705, 68,709 (Nov. 15, 2013) (codified at 16 C.F.R. Part 801).
48. Id.
49. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Act § 18a.
50. Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 78 Fed. Reg.
68,705, 68,709 (Nov. 15, 2013) (codified at 16 C.F.R. Part 801).
51. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Act § 18a.
52. See Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, No. 13-1974, 2014 WL
2431242 (D.D.C. May 30, 2014).
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in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Counsel, Inc.53 and
granted the FTC’s motion for summary judgment after raising and rejecting
each of PhRMA’s arguments.54
The district court engaged in what is commonly known as the “Chevron
two-step” to determine the proper degree of deference to afford the FTC.55 It
failed, however, to consider Chevron “step-zero.”56 Had the district Court
considered step zero, it may have afforded the FTC less deference and
undertaken a more stringent examination of the FTC’s actions, potentially
resulting in different finding as to both the FTC’s authority and compliance
with the APA.
2. Chevron Deference & Step Zero
Development of the Chevron doctrine has significantly increased the
frequency in which courts afford administrative interpretation of relevant
statutes a high level of deference, overturning an agency action or
interpretation only if it is unreasonable.57 In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., the Court held that where Congress leaves
gaps and ambiguities in statutes implemented by administrative agencies, an
implied grant of interpretive authority.58 The Chevron court coined a two-step
analysis in which courts ask first whether the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous as to the interpretation in question.59 If the answer is no, courts
then considers the soundness of the agency’s interpretation.60 The agency’s
interpretation need not be ingenious, rather, it must merely be reasonable.61
This analytical structure is commonly known as the Chevron-two-step for
obvious reasons, however, since the Chevron decision, academics and the
courts alike have contemplated an additional step.62
This additional step, aptly named “step-zero,” is the initial inquiry and

53. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
54. See Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am., 2014 WL 2431242.
55. See id. at *10–20.
56. See id.
57. Kristin E. Hickman & Thomas W. Merrill, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001).
58. See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
59. Id. at 842–43.
60. Id. at 843.
61. Id.
62. See generally, Hickman & Merrill, supra note 57; United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218 (2000). See also generally, Cass R Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment
of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008); Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness And Legitimacy in the Administrative State,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003).
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determines whether courts should even turn to the Chevron two-step.63
Advocates of “step-zero” reason that before applying the Chevron two-step,
which applies only to agencies whose rule making carries the force of law,
courts should inquire as to whether deference to agency action was truly
Congress’ intent because deference to Chevron is based on the implied
authority from the legislature.64 The Chevron two-step assumes Congressional
intent, however, where it can be demonstrated that Congress did not intend to
grant an administrative agency authority to make an interpretation, courts
apply the less deferential Skidmore standard of review, as the Supreme Court
did in United States v. Mead Corp.65
Thomas Merrill and Kristen Hickman also suggest that courts should
adopt an exemption from Chevron deference for interpretations by agencies
implicating the scope of its own authority.66 The reasoning for the proposed
exception holds that courts have never deferred to agencies on questions of
their own power and it makes little sense to presume that Congress delegated
an agency the authority to interpret the scope of its own authority.67
Furthermore, if agencies have the power to define the scope of their own
authority, judicial oversight will seemingly be removed from the system of
checks and balances.68
The scope of authority exemption has not yet taken hold in the courts;
however, its premature confines have begun to appear in case law.69 In
Mississippi Power & Light v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, Justice Brennan
argued in dissent that:
[a]gencies do not ‘administer’ statutes confining the scope of their
jurisdiction . . . [n]or do the normal reasons for agency deference
apply . . . It is thus not surprising that this Court has never deferred to
an agency’s interpretation of a statute designed to confine the scope of
its jurisdiction.70
Considering the same question more recently, in City of Arlington v. FCC,
Chief Justice Breyer wrote in concurrence that “the existence of statutory
63. Hickman & Merrill, supra note 57, at 836.
64. Hickman & Merrill, supra note 57, at 912; Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,
587 (2000); Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 227.
65. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218.
66. Hickman & Merrill, supra note 57, at 909.
67. Id. at 909–10.
68. Id.
69. See Mississippi Power & Light v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 386–87 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); City of Arlington, Tex., v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1875 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring).
70. Mississippi Power & Light, 487 U.S. at 386–87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ambiguity is sometimes not enough to warrant the conclusion that Congress
has left a deference-warranting gap . . . sometimes context-specific factors
will on occasion prove relevant.”71 In the same case, Chief Justice Roberts
(who was joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito) in his dissenting opinion,
argues that “[a] congressional grant of authority over some portion of a statute
does not necessarily mean that Congress granted the agency interpretative
authority over all its provisions.”72
Case law indicates the idea that proponents of implementation of a flat
exception from Chevron deference for interpretations implicating the
agency’s authority is still fighting an uphill battle.73 In response to Justice
Breyer’s Mississippi Power & Light dissent, Justice Scalia wrote in his own
concurring opinion “it is settled law that the rule of deference applies even to
an agency’s interpretation of its own . . . authority.”74 In City of Arlington, the
majority held “[t]he dissent is correct that . . . for Chevron deference to apply,
the agency must have received congressional authority to determine the
particular matter at issue.”75 The Court, however, goes on to say “[w]hat the
dissent . . . fails to produce is a single case in which a general conferral of
rulemaking . . . authority has been insufficient to support Chevron deference
for an exercise of that authority,” seemingly regardless of the nature of the
interpretation.76
Therefore, for the time being, a plaintiff hoping to avoid Chevron
deference to administrative agency action should not rely solely on the
argument that such deference should not apply to interpretations of scope of
authority. Rather, the plaintiff should set out to demonstrate via legislative
history, statutory construction, policy and language of an enabling act, that
Congress did not intend to grant the agency authority to determine the
particular matter at issue.
In Pharm. Research and Mfrs. Of Am. V. Fed. Trade Comm’n, the district
court conducted a Chevron two-step analysis, however, the Court failed to
consider Chevron step zero.77 The Court ultimately determined that the FTC’s
actions should be afforded Chevron deference.78 Had the Court considered

71. City of Arlington, Tex., 133 S. Ct. at 1875 (Breyer, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 1883 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
73. See Miss. Power & Light, 487 U.S. at 381(Scalia, J., concurring); City of Arlington, Tex.,
133 S. Ct. at 1874.
74. Miss. Power & Light, 487 U.S. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring).
75. City of Arlington, Tex., 133 S. Ct. at 1874.
76. Id.
77. See Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, No. 13-1974, 2014 WL
2431242, at *10 (D.D.C. May 30, 2014).
78. Id.
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rather than assumed Chevron step zero, the outcome may have differed. In
determining whether to engage a Chevron two-step analysis, the Court should
have examined the legislative history, statutory construction, policy, and
language of the HSR Act to determine whether it was truly Congress’ intent to
delegate the FTC authority to determine its own ability to regulate a single
industry. On the one hand the structure of the HSR Act, its legislative history,
and comments made by one of the bill’s sponsors and namesakes, strongly
support a finding that Congress did not intend to grant the FTC such
authority. On the other hand, section (d)(2)(C) of the HSR Act provides a
broad grant of power that could be read as Congress conceding that measures
not contemplated by the HSR Act may be necessary and subsequently the
FTC exercised that broad power delegated to it by Congress.
A strong argument can be made that Congress did not intend to grant the
FTC authority to interpret the Act as they did. If that argument is persuasive,
engaging in a Chevron two-step analysis as well as the granting of Chevron
deference by the district court was inappropriate. Structurally, the HSR Act’s
starting point is that all transactions must be presented to the PNO for
approval.79 As previously discussed, the Act goes on to provide three types of
exemptions from the filing requirements in specific situations in which the
class of transaction or persons in question are not likely to have an
anticompetitive effect on the market for one reason or another.80 This
illustrates that the Act is set up in a way so as to require regulation, except in
the special and specific cases in which either Congress or the FTC determines
it is not likely that the antitrust laws will be violated. The structure is
informative and indicates that Congress did not foresee nor intend the FTC to
have authority to actively regulate a single industry. Rather, it seems Congress
intended the FTC to have authority to exempt single industries from
regulation.
The legislative history reinforces this conclusion. The congressional
record reveals that the legislature considered granting the FTC power to
regulate a single industry.81 An early draft of the law included a power for the
FTC to require filings “from particular . . . industries.”82 Congress, however,
intentionally removed that language from the bill, deciding the FTC should
not wield such a power.83 Commenting on the deletion, the bill’s namesake
and sponsor, Representative Rodino, explained, “in the view of the House

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (2012).
See id. §18a(a)–(d).
See 122 CONG. REC. 29,342 (Sept. 8, 1976).
122 CONG. REC. 29,342 (Sept. 8, 1976).
See 122 CONG. REC. 30,877 (Sept. 16, 1976).
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conferees, the coverage of this bill should be decided by Congress – not the
FTC.”84 Furthermore, while the language of the bill was being negotiated in
the Senate, an amendment was considered that would have granted the FTC
authority to “promulgate rules of general or special applicability.”85 The
Senate decided not to grant such authority, removing the clause as the House
had done with a similar clause, because it appeared to give the FTC rule
making authority “either appropriately dealt with in other sections, or are so
broad and general as to threaten to undermine an otherwise carefully
structured statutory scheme.”86 Again, indicating that the HSR Act was
intentional structured to provide the FTC with certain powers and to withhold
others.
In sum, Congress structured the HSR Act in a way that gave the FTC
authority and discretion to exempt specific and special classes of persons and
transactions from the filing requirement of the premerger notification
program. Additionally, Congress made the intentional decision not to grant
the FTC authority to regulate a single industry. Viewed this way, it seems
unlikely that Congress decided not to grant the FTC authority while
simultaneously making an implied grant of the exact same authority.
On the other hand, arguments can be made that refute that conclusion.
Section (d)(2)(C) of the HSR Act authorizes the FTC to “prescribe other rules
as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the purposes of this
section.”87 One might argue that while the structure of the HSR Act indeed
suggests that the FTC’s typical role is to make exemptions from the filing
requirement, the broad grant of authority made in section (d)(2)(C) is
effectively Congress’ concession that over time, rules Congress did not
contemplate may become necessary. This could be true, especially in light of
section (d)(2)(B). Section (d)(2)(B) of the HSR authorizes the FTC to make
special exemptions where transactions are not likely to violate antitrust laws.88
Thus, it could be argued that the HSR Act is structured in a way that
begins with all persons and transactions falling subject to regulation unless an
exemption is applied, included within that structure is a power to grant special
exemptions, and yet, Congress included an additional power to prescribe
“other” rules. Clearly, “other rules” would be different from those rules
included in the act. Therefore, section (d)(2)(B) grants the FTC authority to
take action other than exempting persons or transactions from regulation, such

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

122 CONG. REC. 30,877 (Sept. 16, 1976) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
Antitrust Improvements Act, S. 1284, 94th CONG. § 7A (b)(4)(A)(1976).
122 CONG. REC. 15,812 (1976).
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d)(2)(C) (2012).
Id. §18a(d)(2)(B).

LEVERINGTON FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

5/11/2015 11:12 AM

HART SCOTT RONDINO & CHEVRON STEP ZERO

325

as actively subjecting individual industries to regulation. If a court finds this
second argument persuasive, it will hold that the FTC was merely exercising
the authority delegated to it by Congress and its rule-making decisions with
the force of law will be afforded Chevron deference.
Because Chevron deference is based in implied congressional delegation
of authority, the issue turns on congressional intent. An argument can be
made that both the structure of the HSR Act and the broad catch-all grant of
authority in section (d)(2)(C), indicate congressional intent that the FTC have
the means to take “other” “necessary and appropriate” action as it saw fit.
Stated another way, Congress intended that the FTC would interpret section
(d)(2)(C) in a way that would enable the commission to carry out the purposes
of the Act. If not for the intentional and explicit decision Congress made not
to grant the FTC authority to regulate single industries, such an argument
would likely be persuasive. It cannot be said that Congress intended to
withhold such a power from the FTC, while simultaneously intending to grant
the same power to the FTC. Chevron deference is a very difficult hurdle for
petitioners to overcome, and on a question of Congressional intent, where
explicit language indicating a contrary Congressional intent, such a level of
deference is not appropriate. Such a finding is not, however, a damning result
for the FTC action or agencies more generally. Where Chevron deference is
not applicable, agency actions will still be afforded Skidmore deference.89
III. THE EFFECTS OF THE INTERSECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW,
ANTITRUST LAW, AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION.
The premerger notification program aims to preemptively block
anticompetitive activity.90 The program also has potential to negatively impact
the development of life-saving drugs if it is not implemented properly. This
illustrates a larger incongruence that occurs between intellectual property
rights and administrative enforcement of antitrust law. Patents are intended to
incentivize innovation by ensuring that innovators will have a period of time
in which they face less competition to recoup the expenses incurred in the
costly research and development process. Agency enforcement of antitrust
law, however, is intended to prevent or negate situations in which a market
will become less competitive. These two goals and approaches to the market
are strictly at odds with one another. The cost of these clashing legal
doctrines can be especially high in the pharmaceutical industry, where
research and development is often extremely expensive.
While a lack of regulation or oversight could lead to fewer choices and
89. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2000).
90. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Act § 18a.
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higher prices for consumers heavily dependent on the drugs, over-zealous
regulation could have the same effect.91 If the FTC is overly aggressive in its
administration of paragraph (g), administrative costs of transactions could
increase significantly. In a highly competitive industry with constantly
changing science, the potential for a transaction to get tied up in the FTC’s
antitrust office, consuming large amounts of time and money, is a serious
issue manufacturers will take into account when contemplating potential
partnerships. While there is little doubt that regulation is necessary, it is
important to ensure that regulatory costs do not clog the developmental
pipelines that allow small drug developers to team with larger entities capable
of ensuring new drugs meet their full potential.
Increased regulatory costs may simply force the industry to be more
selective in what drugs are worth the financial risk. The problem is evident,
however, when one considers the possibility that the drug that finally cures
cancer, Alzheimer’s disease, or AIDS will start as a long shot that simply
cannot overcome the potential risks and costs associated with the FTC’s new
requirements. A drug that would have saved thousands or even millions of
lives could be lost before its potential is realized.
CONCLUSION
The FTC’s recent amendment of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act targets a
single industry, something the FTC has never done pursuant to the HSR Act.
The Commission’s authority to take such action and whether it did so in
compliance with the APA is questionable. PhRMA’s lawsuit challenging the
rule may have been on track to invalidate the new rule, however, after the
District Court failed to apply Chevron step zero and afforded the agency
action significantly more deference than it may have been due, the FTC was
granted summary judgment.92
PhRMA has filed notice of appeal and is currently awaiting its next day in
court.93 If the appellate court properly applies Chevron step zero rather than
assume the answer, as the district court seemingly did, the Skidmore deference
standard is likely to be applied – resulting in a more stringent examination of
the claims.
91. Burrell, supra note 19, at 5.
92. Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, No. 13-1974, 2014 WL
2431242 (D.D.C. May 30, 2014).
93. Civil Docket for Case #: 1:13-cv-01974-BAH, (last updated July 30, 2014, 10:03 AM),
available online at https://www.bloomberglaw.com/search/results/fc7597ff5de47944c2b95c80565
b8e54/document/X1Q6N5OAHCO2?search32=C9P6UQR5E9FN6PB1E9HMGNRK
CLP6QF9H78OJ6BB3EOMJ0C9P6SQ2QGI190TJMRJFBTKMQS2VE1K
74OBJCLPJQC9R7DJ6IU2VC9NMUR2VE5QMASJP7KOG.
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This case will have an impact upon more than the level deference afforded
to administrative action. This case could impact tens of thousands of lives, if
not more. If the new amendment stands, it will undoubtedly increase
compliance costs and delay the process of getting new drugs to market. On
the other hand, the new regulation could – as it is intended to do – make the
market for prescription drugs more competitive, ensuring people can afford
the drugs they so badly need. Which of these considerations will outweigh the
others? What are the magnitudes of their respective impacts? If the regulation
stands, what role will human discretion in the administration of the new
amendments play? We simply cannot know until we see how the amendment
operates in practice and how pharmaceutical manufacturers respond.
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